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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses and compares the effects of common demand and
supply shocks on the setting of optimal monetary policies under a clean
float, a managed exchange-rate system (such as the EMS) and a monetary union
when welfare depends on unemployment and the cost of living. The results
suggest that monetary union yields the smallest welfare loss and a float the
greatest welfare loss and that the EMS gives France and Italy the
opportunity to appreciate their currencies and reduce the damage to their
welfare loss at the expense of Germany.
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1. Introduction
The European Monetary System is characterised by Germany hegemony in
very much the same way that the Gold Standard was characterised by UK
hegemony and Bretton Woods by US hegemony (e.g. Giavazzi and Giovannini,
1989). These are examples of managed exchange-rate regimes in the sense that
Germany (UK or US) sets monetary policy for the region whilst the other
countries effectively peg (pegged) their currencies to the Deutschemark (the
pound or the dollar). In view of the arguments put forward by the Delors
Committee in favour of economic and monetary union in Europe and the
establishment of a European Central Bank, it is of importance to investigate
the disadvantages of the European Monetary System compared with a European
Monetary Union. This paper looks at the effectiveness and need for
coordination of monetary policies, in the face of unemployment and inflation
caused by adverse demand and supply shocks, under three regimes: (i)
floating exchange rates; (ii) managed exchange rates and hegemony (the
European Monetary System); and (iii) irrevocably fixed exchange rates and a
centralised monetary policy (European Monetary Union). Since the European
Community has already decided that eight member countries will have fully
liberalised capital movements by lst July 199o and that the other countries
will follow suit, it seems reasonable to assume perfect capital mobility in
each of these three regimes.
2. Monetary policies under floating exchange-rates
A short-run Keynesian two-country model with nominal wage rigidity,
inmobility of labour, imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods,
perfect capital mobility and, for simplicity, static expectations can be
written as:
Y- -6 r t ó(P~te-p) t f t~y~ , 0 S~ ~ 1 (1)
Y~` --6 r- á (P~`te-P) t f~ t~Y, 6, S~ 0 (2)
m-p-Y-~r, ~~ G (3)2
m~ - p~ - y~ - ~r (4)
where y, f, r, p, e and m der,ote real output, a demand shock, thé (world)
interest rate, the price level (an adverse supply shock), the nominal
exchange-rate (price of foreign exchange in terms of domestic currency) and
the money supply, respectively. Variables are expressed as percentage
deviations from their steady-state values, except for r which is expressed
as an arithmetic deviation from its equilibrium value. Foreign variables are
denoted with an asterisk. Under floating exchange-rates both money supplies
are exogenous policy instruments, since the exchange rate adjusts to keep
the balance of payments in equilibrium. It follows that:
r - ~C(lt~) (ftf~) - (m-p) - (m~-P~)~~(6}~) (5)
c - p~te-p - ~C(m-P) - (m~-P~) t (1-~) (f~-f)~~~ (6)
Y - ~[(26t~) ( m-P) - ~(m~-P~) t (1}~)~ (ftf~)~~(6}~) (7)
where o-~~(1-~), S-S~(lt~) and f-f~(1-~2). Hence, a monetary expansion
reduces world interest rates, leads to a depreciation of the real exchange
rate and is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. A ( bond-financed) fiscal
expansion increases world interest rates, leads to an appreciation of the
real-exchange rate and is a locomotive policy. These results confirm the
well-known analysis of Mundell (1g68).
We will assume that each central bank is concerned about achieving on
the one hand full employment and on the other hand ensuring a low cost-of-
living index,
P-(1-a)P } a(P~te) - P t ac. 0 ~ a~ 1
c (8)
where a denotes the share of imports in final expenditures. Hence, the
problem for the home central bank is
Min W-(Y-Yd)2 } g(Pc}c~)2, Yd, w, 8 Z 0
m
(9)3
and similarly for the foreign central bank. For example, a common adverse
demand shock (f-f~--d ~ 0) causes unemployment and leaves the cost-of-living
index ur.affected, so the targets yd-(lt~}~dJ(~}a) ~ 0 and w-G are warranted.
Alternatively, a common adverse supply shock (e.g., an increase in the wedge
between producers' and consumers' wage, a detoriation in productivity or an
increase in oil prices, p-p~-s ~ 0) causes unemployment and an increase in
the cost-of-living index, so 0~ yd - cs~(Gt~) ~ s and w-s are warranted.
The non-cooperative outcome is where m minimises W given m~` and m~`
mïnïmises W~` given m and is denoted by the subscript F. The cooperative
outcome is where m and m~ jointly minimise the global welfare loss, W t W~,
and is denoted by the subscript U. It is straightforward to establish that
mF - I c~~J
L Yd -( 9~G ) c~ ]~ mU - I c6~J
yd (10)
where ~( G-(ct2~}~(Gt~) ~ 1, g- 4ga2~á2 and w- 2bw~oc. Note that a
common demand shock creates no need for the international coordination of
monetary policies, because non-cooperative decision-making already achieves
full employment (mF- mU- (lt~)~d~6'
yF- yU- yd)' World interest rates fall
(rF- rU- -(lt~)d~6), both because of the fall in the demand for goods caused
by the shock and by the induced monetary expansions. A common adverse supply
shock does create a need for international policy coordination, because
otherwise monetary policies would be too tight and consequently there would
be unemployment (yF- yd-(~~o)~ ~ yU- yd). The reason is that, in the absence
of coordination, each central bank attempts to export inflation by
appreciating its exchange rate. Policy coordination realises that such
competitive appreciations are futile. Similar results are obtained by Oudiz
and Sachs (1984), by Canzoneri and Henderson (1987), and by Oudiz and Sachs
and others in Buiter and Marston (1985).
3. Managed exchange rates
The previous section considered the coordination of monetary policies
under a clean float. Here an asymmetric regime of managed exchange rates is
considered. In particular, the foreign central bank is assumed to be in full
control of its money supply whilst the home central bank manages its4
exchange rate and thereby gives up an independent monetary policy. This is
in accordance with the view that the European Monetary System operates as a
greater Deutschemark zone (Giavazzi arid Giovannini, 1~89); trie Bundesbank
determines the monetary policy for the whole of Europe whilst the other
central banks of Europe peg and periodically realign their currencies vis-à-
vis the Deutschemark. Similarly, it can be argued that the Gold Standard was
characterised by UK hegemony and Bretton Woods by US hegemony. If there is
pressure on the home currency to devalue (eT), the home central bank sells
foreign currency in exchange for home currency in order to meet the deficit
on the balance of payments and thereby defends its exchange rate. There is a
corresponding fall in the home money supply, so that the home central bank
cannot have an independent monetary policy. When e and m~`, rather than m and
m~, are exogenous, equations (5)-(~) can be rewritten as:
r-[-~e - m~` t~f t f~ t bP t(1-b)P~~~(6t~) (11)
m - 2~e } m~` t (1-y) (f-f~) } (1-2~) (P-P~)
Y - [Gm~ } ((1-~) c~}a) f - ((1-~)G-y~)f~ } (ZG}~) á(e-P)
- ((1-2b)6 - b~)P~~~(6t~)-




A contraction in the German money supply (m~~,) leads to an equal fall
in, say, the French money supply, because the French are defending
themselves against a depreciating currency by buying up francs. Hence, the
increase in European interest rates and the associated crowding out of
private consumption and investment throughout Europe is twice as large as
under a clean float. With a fixed exchange rate, there is no adverse effect
on German net exports and employment arising from an appreciation of the
Deutschemark and therefore monetary contraction in Germany increases
unemployment throughout Europe by the same amount. Conversely, a German
monetary expansion is now a locomotive (rather than) a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy.5
A devaluation of the currencies of the rest of Europe vis-à-vis the
Deutschemark (eT) improves net exports to Germany and thus boosts non-German
employment and output and increases unemployment in Germany. To choke off
the resulting excess supply of German money, European interest rates fall
and as a result non-German money demand increases in line with non-German
money supply. Since the European money supply increases and European
interest rates fall, the increase in non-German output exceeds the fall in
German output. Clearly, such a devaluation is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
However, it increases the cost of living at home and decreases it in
Germany.
We will now look at the situation where the central banks of the rest
of Europe periodically realign and control their exchange-rate (e) to
minimise W(given by (9)) and the Bundesbank chooses its money supply (m~)
to minimise W~. Any complications arising from speculative attacks, e.g.,
agents selling liras for Deutschemarks, when a devaluation of the lira is
anticipated, and credibility are ignored, even though all capital controls
are assumed to be abolished. The reaction function of the Bundesbank is
upward-sloping, because a devaluation of the other currencies causes German
unemployment and a fall in the German cost of living so that the Bundesbank
reacts with a monetary expansion. The reaction functions of the other
central banks are downward-sloping, because a German monetary expansion
boosts employment elsewhere in Europe and therefore the other central banks
can afford to pay more attention to their cost-of-living targets and
appreciate their currencies. Intersection of the reaction functions yields
the outcome for a non-cooperative managed exchange-rate regime, which is
denoted by the subscript M:
eM --C9~2á (3tc5)7w 5 eF - eU - 0
m~` - I G}~ I yd - ~~ ,. c, s m~`
M l 6) 2G(8}cT) U
t t
m - m~ s m G~ d ( 2G ~) D 5 m~ s m - m~
F F M- G y- ' w M U U
2G(.~ItG)




yM - Yd - 9(9'tc~)-lw 5 yU - Yd
YM - YU - Yd z YM ~ YF - YF .
(19)
(20)
The cooperative outcome chooses e and m~ to minimise the European
welfare loss (WtW~) and yields the same full-employment outcomes as a
cooperative clean float: eU- 0, yU- yU - yd, mU- mU -(6t~)yd~~ and rU- rU -
d
-y ~c. In fact, it can be shown that international policy coordination under
a managed exchange-rate system or under a clean float yields the same
outcome as a European Monetary Union and are therefore all denoted by the
subscript U. The associated welfare losses are:
0 s WM - gw2 ~(gto2)~(gto)2~ 5 WU - WU - gw2 S ~(WMt WM) s
WM - 9w2 ~(2gtc~)~(gto)~2.
In addition, it can be shown that 1
~(WM t WM) S WF - WF.
(21)
(22)
One cannot say whether WF - WF is less or greater than WM. However, one can
show that WF - WF is less (greater) than or equal to WM, whenever g is small
(large)2.
1 The proof is that this inequality requires for w~0 that g(g)-g2 t~(2-~) g
t~c2~ 0, which is the case as g(0) - ~~2 ~ 0 and g'(0) - 2g }~(2-a) ~ 0.
2 WF - WF C WM requires that f(g) - g2 t(2G-3~2) g} ~2 - 2cs3 ~ 0, so that
~2 ~
f(0) - c(1-2~) ~ 0 and f"(0) - 2. Hence, this inequality holds for small
g and is violated for large g.4. Interpretation of the results
The interpretation of the above results is as follows:
(i) Coordination of monetary policies in the face of a common adverse demand
or supply shock leads to full employment throughout Europe, irrespective of
whether intra-European exchange rates float, are managed or are irrevocably
fixed. This is achieved with an equal increase in all European money
supplies and a fall in European interest rates, whilst intra-European
exchange rates are unaffected. Hence, international coordination of monetary
policies within Europe may facilitate the move towards a European Monetary
Union.
(ii) In the face of a common adverse demand shock (yd ~ 0, W-0), there is no
need for international policy coordination as it does not create
international conflict over the cost of living. This result holds for a
clean float, the European Monetary System and a European Monetary Union.
(iii) A common adverse supply shock leads under a non-cooperative European
managed exchange-rate system to an appreciation of the lira, franc and
guilder vis-à-vis the Deutschemark even though the European economies are
assumed to have symmetric structures and are hit by identical shocks. Hence,
the non-German economies use an appreciation of the real exchange rate to
disinflate away the consequences of an adverse supply shock. This occurs
because the Bundesbank expands its money supply by more than the other
European central banks. Germany achieves full employment but does not score
on its cost-of-living target, whilst the rest of Europe scores less well on
the unemployment target, but scores somewhat on its cost-of-living target.
The rest of Europe achieves a smaller welfare loss than Germany, so that the
exchange-rate realignment allows the rest of Europe to reduce the damage to
its welfare at the expense of Germany.
(iv) Comparison of a non-cooperative managed exchange-rate system with a
non-cooperative float shows that the latter leads to lower money stocks,
higher interest rates and more unemployment because the latter leads to
futile attempts to engage in competitive appreciations of the exchange rate
and export inflation abroad.
(v) Comparison of a non-cooperative managed exchange-rate system with a
European Monetary Union shows that the latter leads to higher money supplies
and lower interest rates and thus to full employment in both Germany and the8
rest of Europe. A managed exchange-rate system is worse for Germany (despite
the fact that there is full employment in Germany) and better for the rest
of Europe than a monetary union and for Europe as a whole it is worse than a
monetary union. This is a reason why Germany may be keen on the
recommendations for a more symmetric European System of Central Banks,
recently proposed by the Delors Committee, and why the rest of Europe may be
less keen.
(vi) A European Monetary Union yields the smallest welfare loss and a non-
cooperative float yields the highest welfare loss. Under the European
Monetary System France and Italy are better off than under monetary union
whilst Germany is worse off, but on average Europe is better off with the
European Monetary System than with a non-cooperative float and worse off
with the European Monetary System than with a monetary union.
(vii) When countries are very conservative, i.e., care relatively much more
about the cost of living than unemployment, then Germany prefers the
European Monetary System to a non-cooperative float, else Germany prefers a
floating exchange-rate regime. The reason is, of course, that the European
Monetary System avoids to a certain extent competitive, futile attempts to
appreciate the currency and thus leads to looser monetary policies and less
unemployment.
5. Related work
Giavazzi and Giovannini (1986) also show that the non-German economies
in a European managed exchange-rate system use an appreciation of the real
exchange rate to disinflate a common adverse supply shock. However, their
model does not have the real exchange rate affecting the cost of living but
affecting aggregate supply through the usage of imported raw materials and
their analysis does not fully compare welfare of the countries concerned for
the alternative exchange-rate regimes. They also argue that with a country-
specific demand shock, Germany can be better rather than worse off than the
rest of Europe under a managed exchange-rate system. This result arises from
the negative spill-over effects which in part relieve Germany from the bias
in non-cooperative decision making. Basevi and Giavazzi (1987} perform a
number of numerical exercises when the European economies do not have9
identical structures and then, even under a monetary union, intra-European
exchange rates need not remain fixed. This suggests that the completion of a
common European market is a prerequisite for full monetary union within
Europe. Kenen (1987) uses a two-country portfolio-balance model to analyse
the question which exchange-rate regime allows individual governments to
achieve their national objectives without international policy coordination
and finds that the answer depends on both the nature and origin of the
shock.
The analysis conducted in this paper is, of course, relevant for the
understanding of non-cooperative stabilisation policies under alternative
exchange-rate regimes and finds that a European Monetary Union is the most
desirable regime. The studies in Buiter and Marston (1985) report numerical
policy coordination exercises that allow for rational expectations and wage
dynamics, but are restricted to floating exchange rates. One of the lessons
is that international policy coordination can worsen the credibility and
destroy the discipline of central banks and can thus be counterproductive
(Rogoff, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1988). Hamada (1976) adopts a long-run
monetary approach to the balance of payments with full employment to discuss
international coordination of monetary policies under fixed exchange rates.
The main result is that, in the absence of international policy
coordination, inflation is too high when the increase in international
reserves exceeds the average of desired balances of payments. Under floating
exchange rates each country can isolate its inflation rate and there is thus
no need for international policy coordination. Van der Ploeg (1987)
considers a full-employment setting with capital accumulation and perfect
asset mobility. Under a clean float an expansion in monetary growth reduces
world real interest rates ard boosts capital accumulation and activity
throughout the world (the interdependent Mundell-Tobin effect). Since
inflation increases at home and nowhere else, no country wishes to carry the
burden of reducing the world real interest rate and thus absence of
international policy coordination implies a stale-mate in the sense that
monetary growth, inflation and activity are too low whilst real interest
rates are too high. Under fixed exchange rates these inefficiencies are
considerably reduced, because all countries share the burden as well as the
benefits of an increase in monetary growth and consequently there is much
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